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Bankruptcy
by W. Homer Drake, Jr.*
and
Michael M. Duclos"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike past years when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit issued a tremendous number of bankruptcy decisions
each term, 1997 turned out to be a very quiet year because the Eleventh
Circuit issued only eight opinions addressing matters arising under the
Bankruptcy Code.' This Article is a survey of those 1997 bankruptcy
decisions.
II.

FEES AND EXPENSES INCURRED BY BANKRUPTCY PROFESSIONALS

Reimbursable Expenses
In Stroock & Stroock & Lavan v. HillsboroughHoldings Corp. (In re
HillsboroughHoldings Corp.),2 the Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue
very close to the hearts of all bankruptcy practitioners-reimbursable
attorney expenses. According to section 330(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code,' the bankruptcy court may award attorneys employed in the
A.

* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1954; L.L.B. 1956). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate with the law firm of Fortson, Bentley and Griffin, Athens, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1989); University of Georgia (J.D., 1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in 11 U.S.C. and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. 127 F.3d 1398 (11th Cir. 1997).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(B) (1994). The Code section applicable to this case previously
existed at 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2) but currently exists at 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1XB) as a result
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4119, 4130 (1994).
This Article refers to the current version of the Code.
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bankruptcy case "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.4
During the early stages of the complex bankruptcy case involving
Hillsborough Holdings, various law firms applied for interim compensation and reimbursement for expenses. 5 With the first interim applications, the bankruptcy court ruled that it would not reimburse the law
firms for certain expenses the court deemed "overhead."6 These
expenses included: postage, secretarial charges, word processing, local
travel expenses, meals, express mail, messenger delivery expenses, copy
charges, laundry, office supplies, and computer research charges.' In
subsequent fee applications during the course of the case, the bankruptcy court continued to deny "without discussion" these expenses.' The
bankruptcy court maintained this position through the final fee
application.9 In the process, the firm of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan
failed to obtain reimbursement for $341,953.01 of requested expenses,
and the firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler failed to obtain
reimbursement for expenses totaling $514,636.97.0 The law firms
appealed.11
The Eleventh Circuit noted that an attorney compensation award
would be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion, but the failure of the
bankruptcy court to apply the proper legal standard would constitute
such an abuse.12 In this case the bankruptcy court determined at the
outset (i.e., before most of the expenses actually were incurred) that the
subject expenses were "overhead" and not reimbursable because they
should have been "built into the applicant's hourly billing rate."13 As
a result, no evidence or factual finding was ever made by the court that
the law firms in question had actually incorporated the costs of those
expenses into their hourly rates.14 In fact, the evidence indicated the
contrary because the law firms claimed their hourly rates were set on
the assumption that the subject costs and expenses would be billed
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy
separately."
court's initial declaration that these expenses were "overhead," without

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(B).
127 F.3d at 1400.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1400-01.
Id. at 1401.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the bankruptcy court order).
Id.
Id.
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making any inquiry into facts, constituted the application of a legal

standard and not a finding of fact. 6
The court in Hillsborough then decided that the legal standard applied
by the bankruptcy court was incorrect. 7 In reaching this decision, the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed the legislative history of section 330(a)(2) and
noted that the intent of Congress was "to promote the same billing
practices in bankruptcy cases as in other branches of legal practice.""
In other words, it was customary practice in the legal industry to bill
clients for the expenses at issue in this case. Thus, to restrict payment
for certain expenses simply by virtue of the fact that this case was a
bankruptcy case would run contrary to Congress's intent to promote
similar billing practices. While the bankruptcy court had considerable
discretion over the amount of fees and expenses awarded to attorneys,
this discretion did not include the authority to "arbitrarily exclude by
fiat whole categories of otherwise reimbursable expenses."' 9 As a
result, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the bankruptcy court
to allow it to make necessary factual inquiries and findings of fees and
expenses.2 0

B. ProfessionalAccounting Fees
In McMillan v. Joseph Decosimo & Co. (In re Das A. Borden & Co.),"'

an accounting firm attempted to get court approval for payment of its
accounting fees as priority administrative expenses. The bankruptcy
court approved employment of Joseph Decosimo & Company as
accountants for the Das A. Borden & Company bankruptcy case. During
the pendency of the case, however, Decosimo rendered accounting
services not only for the debtor, but also for many other related business
entities.22 Decosimo requested and received approval from the bankruptcy court for payment as an administrative expense priority of its
fees totaling more than ninety-nine thousand dollars for the services it
rendered to these other related business entities.2 The district court
reversed the bankruptcy court decision, and Decosimo appealed.24

16. Id. at 1402.
17. Id. at 1403.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1404.
20. Id. at 1404-05.
21. 131 F.3d 1459 (11th Cir. 1997).
22. Id. at 1461-62. Most of these other related entities also had filed for bankruptcy
protection. Id. at 1461.
23. Id. at 1462.

24. Id.
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According to section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code, a professional
employed in bankruptcy may receive "reasonable compensation for
actual, necessary services rendered" in the bankruptcy case.2" These
fees may qualify for administrative expense priority under section
507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code26 provided that the services were
"'actual and necessary to the preservation of the [bankruptcy] estate.'"2 7 The Eleventh Circuit noted that in order for the fees to qualify
as administrative expenses, the accounting services must run to the
benefit of "'the debtor and be fundamental to the conduct of its
business.' 28 In this particular case, however, Decosimo rendered the
disputed services to entities other than the debtor, and any benefit from
those services ran to those entities and not to the benefit of the
bankruptcy estate of Das A. Borden & Company.29 Therefore, Decosimo
could not recover payment for these fees as administrative expenses from
the Das A. Borden & Company bankruptcy, and its claim was denied."0

III. BAD FAITH AND INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS
The question of whether a creditor acted in bad faith by commencing
an involuntary bankruptcy petition was before the Eleventh Circuit in
General Trading, Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp."' In actuality,
this bankruptcy issue was a mere diversion from the greater dispute
between General Trading and Yale Materials involving the termination
of a franchise agreement. Yale Materials manufactured forklifts and
parts, and General Trading was a dealer. General Trading brought a
civil action against Yale Materials alleging wrongful termination of a
franchise agreement, and a few months thereafter, Yale Materials filed
an involuntary bankruptcy petition against General Trading. The
bankruptcy court later dismissed the involuntary petition after
concluding that Yale Materials had failed to prove that General Trading
was not paying its debts as they became due because the debts in
question were subject to a bona fide dispute.3 2 Thereafter, in the

25. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1XA) (1994).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1994),
27. 131 F.3d at 1463 (quoting In re Colortex Indus., Inc. 19 F.3d 1371, 1383 (11th Cir.
1994)).
28. Id. (quoting In re Colortex, Indus., Inc., 19 F.3d at 1383).
29. Id. at 1464.
30. Id.
31. 119 F.3d 1485 (l1th Cir. 1997).
32. Id. at 1489-90, 1493. According to 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. 1997), one or more
creditors may force a debtor involuntarily into bankruptcy provided that the claims the
creditor or creditors hold against the debtor are not the subject of a bona fide dispute.
Furthermore, the involuntary petition will be dismissed unless the creditor can show that
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related action involving the franchise agreement claim, the district court
ruled that Yale Materials had filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition
in bad faith and assessed punitive damages and attorney fees against
Yale Materials.8"
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted diverging case authority on the
proper standard to determine whether a creditor acted in bad faith by
commencing an involuntary petition." One line of authority utilized
an "improper purpose" test that found bad faith if the petition was
motivated by ill will, malice, or the desire to harass or embarrass the
debtor."6 A second view found bad faith under an "improper use" test
when a creditor improperly used the involuntary petition provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code as a substitute for customary collection procedures.86 A third view analyzed bad faith under the requirements of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.37
Unfortunately, instead of resolving this conflict in case authority, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the facts of this case did not support a
finding of bad faith under any of the above tests.8" Specifically, the
evidence presented showed that Yale Materials' primary concern in filing
the involuntary petition was to protect itself against other creditors
receiving a disproportionate share of General Trading's assets. General
Trading had been liquidating its assets, including collateral that secured
its debts to Yale Materials, without paying off its obligations to Yale
Materials. Other evidence indicated General Trading was making
payments to insiders and unsecured creditors instead of to Yale
Materials. 9 The Eleventh Circuit further noted that case authority
existed upon which Yale Materials could argue that the debts in
question were not subject to a bona fide dispute.4 Had the bankruptcy
court followed that line of authority, the petition would not have been
dismissed. Thus, Yale Materials had a legal basis, in addition to a

the debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become due. 11 U.S.C. § 303(hxl)
(1993). Debts subject to a bona fide dispute are not considered when determining whether
a debtor is paying its debts. Id.
33. 119 F.3d at 1494.
34. Id. at 1501.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1501-02. The requirements of Rule 11 are applied in bankruptcy through
Bankruptcy Rule 9011. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (1994).
38. 119 F.3d at 1502.
39. Id. at 1502-03.
40. Id. at 1504.
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factual basis, to file the involuntary bankruptcy petition.41 As a result,
bad faith did not exist, and the decision of the district court was
reversed.42
IV.

GOOD FAITH AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

The availability of a good faith defense in a fraudulent conveyance
action was questioned in Torcise v. Community Bank of Homestead (In
re Torcise).4 3 The debtor in that case was one of the largest tomato
farmers in Florida. Unfortunately, he began experiencing severe cash
flow problems and found himself deeply indebted to Community Bank
and various other individuals, including Torcise's two brothers and two
stockholders of Community Bank." The debts to Community Bank, his
brothers, and the bank stockholders were unsecured. In order to take
care of these debt obligations, a scheme was set up whereby Community
Bank would lend $3.55 million to Torcise's brothers and the two
stockholders, but Torcise and his business pledged over $7 million in
account receivables to secure the debt. The loaned money actually was
used to satisfy the debts Torcise owed to the two stockholders and his
brothers. In return, Community Bank took control of Torcise's account
receivables. The result was that Community Bank received full payment
on its debts, but small tomato farmers who did business with Torcise lost
millions of dollars.45
Some months after the unsecured debts to Community Bank, the two
stockholders, and Torcise's brothers had been satisfied, Tbrcise and his
business filed for bankruptcy. Thereafter, the committee of unsecured
creditors in the bankruptcy brought an adversary proceeding on grounds
of fraud to recoup the moneys Community Bank took from Torcise to pay
the claims of the bank, its two stockholders, and the two brothers. The
case was tried in district court before a jury, which returned a multimillion dollar verdict against Community Bank. Community Bank
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.'
On appeal, Community Bank argued that the district court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on a good faith defense to fraudulent

41. Id. While the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly approve any of the three
standards used by other courts to determine bad faith, it is interesting to note that the
conclusion that Yale Materials had a reasonable basis in law and fact to support its
involuntary petition is very similar to an analysis under Rule 11.
42. Id. at 1505.
43. 116 F.3d 860 (11th Cir. 1997).
44. Id. at 862. It appears that Torcise was a personal friend of certain stockholders,
directors, and officers of Community Bank. Id
45. Id. at 862-63.
46. Id, at 864.
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transfers as provided by section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.47 The
Eleventh Circuit ruled, however, that the alleged' failure to give the
instructions was not cause for reversible error.49 "Fraud" and "good
faith" were mutually exclusive findings, and Community Bank did not
have a good faith defense if it had committed fraud.' Based upon the
evidence presented at trial, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
Community Bank simply did not have a factual basis to assert a good
faith defense. 5 At the time of the transactions in question, Community
Bank was aware that Torcise and his business were insolvent and owed
millions of dollars. Community Bank was aware that Torcise was
committing fraud with respect to the small tomato farmers, and
Community Bank became an integral part of the fraudulent scheme by
taking control of Torcise's account receivables. As a result, the small
tomato farmers lost millions of dollars, while Community Bank and
others were paid in full on their unsecured claims.5 2 Under these facts,
the evidence did not support a good faith defense for Community
Bank.53
V. EXEMPTION OF INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
In Meehan v. Wallace (In re Meehan)," the Eleventh Circuit decided
an important issue concerning the exempt status of a debtor's individual
retirement account ("IRA") in bankruptcy.5 The debtor, Virginia Ann
Meehan, filed a Chapter 7 petition, and she argued that her IRA, which
she valued at $20,954.47, was excluded from her estate in bankruptcy
pursuant to section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.o Section 541 of

47. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1994), which provides in relevant part that "a transferee
or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien
on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred."
Community Bank also raised two other issues on appeal. One concerned a procedural
matter of joining an allegedly indispensable party, but the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the
party in question was not indispensable. 116 F.3d at 865-67. The other issue was whether
the $3.55 million verdict returned by the jury met mathematical scrutiny. The Eleventh
Circuit ruled that the evidence presented only authorized a verdict of $2.253 million and
remanded the case. Id. at 869-70.
48. The appellees argued that the district court actually did give instructions on the
good faith defense. 116 F.3d at 867-68.

49. Id. at 868.
50. Id.

51. Id. at 869.
52. Id.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
102 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1210.
Id.; 11 U.S.C § 541(c)(2) (1994).
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the Bankruptcy Code addresses what property makes up the debtor's
estate. 7 According to subsection (c)(2), "[a] restriction on the transfer of
a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable" in a bankruptcy case.58
In view of this section, the debtor argued that her IRA was not estate
property because it was subject to a restriction on transfer enforceable
under Georgia law.59 Specifically, Meehan relied upon section 18-422(a) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."), which
stated that "funds or benefits from an individual retirement account...
[are] exempt from the process of garnishment until paid or otherwise
transferred to a member of such program or beneficiary thereof.' °
Both the bankruptcy and district courts rejected the debtor's argument
and concluded that her IRA was a part of the bankruptcy estate.61 The
Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the lower courts. 2 The lower
courts found it significant that the restriction in question existed in statelaw and was not contained in the trust document itself.63 This fact was
deemed significant in view of language in the Supreme Court decision
in Patterson v. Shumate6 4 suggesting that an IRA ordinarily would not
fall under section 541(c)(2) because it lacked transfer restrictions.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found the language from Shumate to
be inapplicable to the case at hand:
[R]ead within its context, it is clear that the Court was commenting
upon the fact that IRAs are not subject to the ERISA-mandated antialienation provision (i.e., federal law does not mandate that IRAs
contain such clauses). Thus, the Court was commenting on the fact
that IRA documents typically would not contain transfer restrictions.

It is clear from the context of the Shumate dicta that the Court was not
addressing the very different factual situation of this case - i.e., where
state law provides a restriction on the transferability of the IRA."

57.

11 U.S.C. § 541.

58. Id. § 541(cX2).
59. 102 F.3d at 1210-11.
60. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22(a) (1991).
61. Meehan v. Wallace (In re Meehan), 162 B.R. 367 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1993), affd, 173
B.R. 818 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd, 102 F.2d 1209 (11th Cir. 1997).
62. 102 F.3d at 1214.

63. Id. at 1211.
64. 504 U.S. 753 (1992). In that case, the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of
the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as used in 11 U.S.C. § 542(cX2). Many courts
had interpreted that language to refer only to state spendthrift law, but the Court
concluded that ERISA-mandated anti-alienation provisions also fell within the scope of
section 542(cX2). Id. at 765. Therefore, the restriction could be found in state law, federal
law, or the trust document itself.
65. 102 F.3d at 1211.
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The O.C.G.A. qualified as "applicable nonbankruptcy law;" it contained
a restriction on the transfer of the IRA and thus fell within the scope of
the section 541(c)(2) exclusion." The court in Meehan reached this
conclusion based upon the plain language of section 541(c)(2) and the
"common sense" interpretation that "a restriction is no less enforceable
because it is located in the statute rather than in the [trust] document." 7
Another argument raised to challenge the application of section
541(c)(2) to the debtor's IRA was that the debtor could withdraw the
corpus of the trust at any time and suffer only a small penalty." The
Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument.69 The court pointed out that
in Shumate the Supreme Court dealt with an ERISA-qualified plan over
which the debtor had extensive control.70 While the Supreme Court did
not explicitly decide the issue, the Eleventh Circuit found that the
holding in Shumate "necessarily mean[t] that such control [by the debtor
over the trust] d[id] not bar exclusion pursuant to § 541(c)(2)."7 ' In
view of the language of section 541(c)(2), the decision in Shumate, and
"congressional concerns about protecting pension benefits," the Eleventh
Circuit held that Meehan's IRA was excluded from her bankruptcy
estate because it was subject to a statutory restriction.72
VI.

ADMINISTRATIvE EXPENSE PRIORITY OF INCOME TAX CLAIMS

In United States v. HillsboroughHoldings Corp. (In re Hillsborough
Holdings Corp.),73 an attempt by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
to grab a bigger piece of the distribution pie proved to be unsuccessful.
The dispute arose because the debtor's fiscal tax year straddled the filing
of the bankruptcy petition, resulting in a portion of the tax liability,
which became due after the filing of the petition, being attributable to
income earned prior to the bankruptcy. 74 The issue was whether the
entire tax liability should qualify as an administrative expense under

66. Id. at 1211-12.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 1212.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1213.
71. Id. The court further noted that this conclusion was consistent with decisions of
the Ninth and Eighth Circuits. Id. See In re Conner, 73 F.3d 258 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 68 (1996); Whetzal v. Alderson, 32 F.3d 1302 (8th Cir. 1994).
72. 102 F.3d at 1213-14.
73. 116 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 1997).
74. Id. at 1392-93.
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section 507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code 75 because it became due after
the date of the petition, or whether only that portion of the debtor's
taxes attributable to its postpetition income could qualify as an
administrative expense. 7'
Both the bankruptcy court 7 and the
district court ruled that only the taxes for the postpetition income could
qualify as administrative expense, and the IRS appealed.'
Answering the dispute required the Eleventh Circuit to determine
whether the taxes in question were "not assessed before, but assessable
... after, the commencement of the case" as stated in section 507(a)(8)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code. 9 If the debtor's income tax fit within the
language of that subsection, then it could not qualify as an administrative expense.8 ' According to the Eleventh Circuit, the unpaid taxes fell
within the "plain language" of the statute.8 ' Because the taxes in
question were not assessed until after the debtor filed
for bankruptcy,
2
they did not qualify as an administrative expense.
The IRS, however, countered that such a reading of the statute would
render an "absurd result," thereby requiring the court to venture beyond
the statute's plain language." According to the IRS, the statute's plain
language would exclude that portion of the taxes attributable to income
earned by the debtor postpetition because those taxes also were not
assessed until after the debtor filed for bankruptcy." Nevertheless, the

75. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1994). Under this section, certain unsecured claims receive
priority of distribution over other unsecured claims if they qualify as administrative
expenses, such as expenses incurred in the administration of the bankruptcy estate.
76. 116 F.3d at 1393.
77. United States v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (Inre Hillsborough Holdings Corp.),
156 B.R. 318 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
78. 116 F.3d at 1393.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (iii) (1994). "The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, redesignated § 507(a)(7) as § 507(a)(8). This case was initiated prior to that
change; [the court] adhere[d] to the designation applicable at the start of these proceedings." 116 F.3d at 1394 n.1. This Article, however, refers to the revised designation.
80. In order for a tax to be an administrative expense, it must meet the following
requirements: (1) it must be incurred by the bankruptcy estate; and (2) it must not be a
kind of tax that is specified in 11 U.S.C. § 507(aX8). 116 F.3d at 1394. Case law on the
first element was split on whether taxes assessed postpetition on prepetition income were
"incurred" by the estate. Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit chose not to settle this
argument; instead its decision rested on whether the tax was of the kind specified in
section 507(aX8). Id. Furthermore, while section 507(aX8) lists a variety of tax obligations,
the only question was whether the tax was of the kind described in subsection (iii). Id. at
1395.
81. 116 F.3d at 1395.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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debtor and the lower courts accepted, without question, that the taxes
for postpetition income did indeed qualify as administrative expenses.8"
To avoid an absurdity, the IRS suggested "that the phrase 'not assessed
before, but assessable after' be interpreted as referring to taxes that
'were assessable both before and after' the filing." 6
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this interpretation because it "stretche[d] the statutory language so far from its plain meaning."8 7 Instead,
it chose to interpret section 507(a)(8)(iii) as addressing only those taxes
that derived from prepetition events, but that were not actually assessed
until after the filing of the bankruptcy petition." In adopting this
interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit joined two other circuits that had
reached the same conclusion s' and avoided the "absurd result" claimed
by the IRS." In this case, the taxes in question were derived from
prepetition events (i.e., prepetition income), but they were not actually
assessed until after the debtor had filed for bankruptcy. As a result,
these taxes were of the kind described in section 507(a)(8)(iii) and thus
could not qualify as administrative expenses.9 1
VII.

CHAPTER 13 PAYMENTS TO CREDITORS

In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Stevens (In re Stevens),' the Eleventh
Circuit considered a trustee's authority to recover alleged overpayments
from a creditor.9' Under the debtor's confirmed Chapter 13 plan, Ford
Motor Credit had a claim secured by a truck that would be paid out at
twelve percent interest, the interest rate being limited by local court
rule. During the course of the Chapter 13 plan, the debtor's truck was
destroyed, and the insurance company paid to Ford, as the loss payee
under the debtor's insurance policy, the remainder of the debt plus the
contract rate of 13.5% interest. As a result of the increased interest
rate, Ford received almost two thousand dollars more than it would have
received under the Chapter 13 plan. The trustee requested that Ford
return the alleged overpayment. After Ford refused, the trustee

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Towers v. United States (In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co.), 64 F.3d 1292 (9th
Cir. 1995); Missouri Dept. of Revenue v. L.J. ONeill Shoe Co. (In re L.J. O'Neill Shoe Co.),
64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995).
90. 116 F.3d at 1396.
91. Id, at 1395-96.
92. 130 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 1997).
93. Id. at 1028-29.
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withheld from Ford a disbursement check that included payments due
to Ford from all debtor accounts administered by the trustee."
The argument on appeal was whether the insurance proceeds for the
destroyed truck were property of the bankruptcy estate." If the
proceeds were, then they would be placed in the estate and distributed
according to the terms of the Chapter 13 plan, resulting in Ford
receiving only twelve percent on its claim." The Eleventh Circuit
noted that the insurance policy at issue protected both the debtor and
Ford from the loss of the truck.9 7 Thus, the insurance proceeds acted
as a substitute for the truck. As a result, Ford's interest in the
insurance proceeds were no greater than its interest in the truck itself.
Because Ford's interest in the truck was determined by the terms of the
Chapter 13 plan, Ford received no greater interest in the insurance
proceeds and was limited to only twelve percent interest on its claim."
Having ruled that Ford was overpaid on its claim, the court addressed
the trustee's act of withholding disbursement checks it owed to Ford.99
Under section 1326(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 13 trustee is
obligated to make payments to creditors as required under the terms of
the confirmed Chapter 13 plan."° On account of the dispute in the
bankruptcy case, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the trustee
violated this duty when he withheld payments to Ford from unrelated
Chapter 13 plans.0 1 Thus, the district court decision that the trustee
acted properly by withholding funds was reversed.' 2
VIII.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

The tricky question of appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy appeals
arose twice in 1997. In the first case, United States v. Hillsborough
Holdings Corp. (In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp.), 3 the Eleventh
Circuit decided it had jurisdiction over an appeal by the IRS of a district
court order concluding that the IRS did not have an administrative
expense claimlo" for prepetition income taxes. 5 In finding appellate

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
Id. at 1030.
Id.
Id. at 1030-31.

100. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(c) (1994).
101. 130 F.3d at 1031.
102. Id.
103. 116 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 1997).
104. Under 11 U.S.C. § 507(aXl), certain unsecured claims receive priority of

distribution over other unsecured claims if they qualify as administrative expenses.
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jurisdiction, the court noted that "[iun the bankruptcy context... finality
is not limited to the last order that concludes an entire bankruptcy
case."'06 Instead, jurisdiction exists when a particular adversary
proceeding or controversy is finally resolved. 0 7 The district court's
conclusion that the tax liability in question did not qualify as an
administrative expense concluded that particular controversy. Because
nothing remained "for either [the] district [court] or [the] bankruptcy
court to do with respect to the administrative claim[,]" the order was
rendered final and appealable."8
In the second case, Clay County Bank v. Culton (In re Culton),1° the
Eleventh Circuit concluded it had no appellate jurisdiction over a district
court's reversal of a bankruptcy court's dismissal order."0 The debtors
had received a Chapter 7 discharge, but sometime thereafter they were
the victims of a burglary, and claimed in a police report that jewelry and
coins worth $42,800 had been taken.'
Upon learning this information, Clay County Bank was able to reopen the debtor's bankruptcy case.
The bank then filed an adversary proceeding to revoke the debtors'
discharge for their failure to declare the later-stolen assets.'12 The
bankruptcy court dismissed the proceeding after concluding that the
statute of limitations
barred the bank's claim, but the district court
113
reversed on appeal.
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit raised sua sponte the issue of
its own immediate appellate jurisdiction over the district court order."" Appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy appeals is limited to
final decisions of the district court." 5 When a district court remands
a case to a bankruptcy court and the remand order requires significant
activity, the district court order generally is not appealable." 6 Thus,
in Culton the district court order was not a final order because it

105. 116 F.3d at 1393-94. For further discussion of the merits of this case, see supra
notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
106. Id. at 1393.

107. Id.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
111 F.3d 92 (lth Cir. 1997).
Id. at 92-93.

111. Id. at 93.
112. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1), (d)(3) (1994).
113. 111 F.3d at 93. The district court concluded that the statute of limitations was

equitably tolled. Id.
114. Id.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
116. 111 F.3d at 93 (citing In re TCL Investors, 775 F.2d 1516, 1518-19 (11th Cir.

1985)).
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required the bankruptcy court to conduct further proceedings to
reinstate the bank's complaint and render a judgment on the merits." 7
Both the debtors and the bank argued that appellate jurisdiction
existed under another statute. They pointed to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, which
provided, in part, that the courts of appeals had jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders concerning injunctive relief."
Not only must an
order be injunctive in effect, but a litigant must show that the order
could have "'serious, perhaps irreparable consequence,' and that the
order can be 'effectively challenged' only by immediate appeal.""9
With respect to the requirement that the order be "injunctive in effect,"
the parties argued that the district court order modified the discharge
injunction of section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code 20 because the order
allowed the bank to commence a proceeding against the debtors based
upon a debt already discharged in bankruptcy.'
While not making
a definitive ruling on this argument, the Eleventh Circuit expressed
doubt about whether the mere reinstatement of a discharge revocation
proceeding was "injunctive in effect" for the purposes of appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.2 Instead, the court in Culton
based its decision on the second requirement that a litigant might suffer
"irreparable consequences" should immediate appeal not be had."
The debtors argued that they would suffer by having to continue to
litigate the issues raised by the bank, expending significant amounts of
time and money in the process." The Eleventh Circuit was unpersuaded by this reasoning and noted instead that the threshold for review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 was a high one."2 The court then held that
the appeal was premature and could not be brought until the bankruptcy
injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524 had been dissolved by revocation of the
debtor's discharge. 26
IX.

CONCLUSION

Despite the sparse number of bankruptcy opinions, 1997 will be known
for its significant decisions, most notably with respect to the exempt

117. Id.
118. Id. (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994)).

119. Id. (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1981)).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 524(aX2) (1994).
121. 111 F.3d at 93-94.
122.

Id. at 94.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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status of individual retirement accounts 2 7 and with respect to reimbursable expenses for bankruptcy professionals. 2 ' On the flip side,
the Eleventh Circuit in 1997 declined to settle a dispute in existing case
law about the proper legal standard for determining bad faith in
involuntary bankruptcy cases." 9 Nevertheless, it is likely that this
and many other issues important to bankruptcy practitioners will be
decided in years to come.

127. Meehan v. Wallace (In re Meehan), 102 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1997).
128. - Stroock & Stroock & Lavan v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (In re Hillsborough
Holdings Corp.), 127 F.3d 1398 (11th Cir. 1997).
129. See General Trading, Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1502
(11th Cir. 1997).

